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to the two saints painted at the left. How fine it would be, thought the Cardinal de Medici, to have St. Lawrence and St. Julian painted in there, to commemorate my father and uncle! They can represent mediators, and thereby connect the two parts of the picture more closely!

Of course, Raphael put them in there! "Alas!" say his critics, "what a fatal mistake! What have those two figures to do there but to mar the work! All for the gratification of a selfish pride!"

Always trust an Artist to dispose of the Finite; he, of all men, knows how to digest it and subordinate it to the idea.

Raphael wanted just such figures in just that place. Of course, the most natural thing in the world that could happen, would be the ascent of some one to bear the message to Christ that there was need of him below. But what is the effect of that upon the work as a piece of Romantic Art? It would destroy that characteristic, if permitted in certain forms. Raphael, however, seizes upon this incident to show the entire spiritual character of the upper part of the picture. The disciples are dazzled so, that even the firm Peter cannot endure the light at all. Is this a physical light? Look at the messengers that have come up the mountain! Do their eyes indicate anything bright, not to say dazzling? They stand there with supplicating looks and gestures, but see no transfiguration. It must be confessed, Cardinal de Medici,

that your uncle and father are not much complimented, after all; they are merely natural men, and have no inner sense by which to see the Eternal Verities that illumine the mystery of existence! Even if you are Cardinal, and they were Popes' counselors, they never saw anything higher in Religion than what should add comfort to us here below!

No! The transfiguration, as Raphael clearly tells us, was a Spiritual one: Christ, on the mountain with his favored three disciples, opened up such celestial clearness in his exposition of the truth, that they saw Moses and Elias, as it were, combined in one Person, and a new Heaven and a new Earth arose before them, and they were lost in that revelation of infinite splendor.

In closing, a remark forces itself upon us with reference to the comparative merits of Raphael and Michael Angelo.

Raphael is the perfection of Romantic Art. Michael Angelo is almost a Greek. His paintings all seem to be pictures of statuary. In his grandest—The Last Judgment—we have the visible presence as the highest. Art with him could represent the Absolute. With Raphael it could only, in its loftiest flights, express its own impotence.

Whether we are to consider Raphael or Michael Angelo as the higher artist, must be decided by an investigation of the merits of the "Last Judgment."

## INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY.

### CHAPTER I.

The object of this series is to furnish, in as popular a form as possible, a course of discipline for those who are beginning the study of philosophy. Strictly *popular*, in the sense the word is used—i. e. signifying that which holds fast to the ordinary consciousness of men, and does not take flights beyond—I am well aware, no philosophy can be. The nearest approach to it that can be made, consists in starting from the common external views, and

drawing them into the speculative, step by step. For this purpose the method of definitions and axioms, with deductions therefrom, as employed by Spinoza, is more appropriate at first, and afterwards a gradual approach to the *Dialectic*, or true philosophie method. In the mathematical method (that of Spinoza just alluded to) the content may be speculative, but its form, never. Hence the student of philosophy needs only to turn his attention to the content at first; when that becomes in a

measure familiar, he can then the more readily pass over to the true form of the speculative content, and thus achieve complete insight. A course of discipline in the speculative content, though under an inadequate form, would make a grand preparation for the study of Hegel or Plato; while a study of these, or, in short, of any writers who employ speculative *methods* in treating speculative *content*—a study of these without previous acquaintance with the content is well nigh fruitless. One needs only to read the comments of translators of Plato upon his speculative passages, or the prevailing verdicts upon Hegel, to be satisfied on this point.

The course that I shall here present will embody my own experience, to a great extent, in the chronological order of its development. Each lesson will endeavor to present an *aperçu* derived from some great philosopher. Those coming later will presuppose the earlier ones, and frequently throw new light upon them.

As one who undertakes the manufacture of an elegant piece of furniture needs carefully elaborated tools for that end, so must the thinker who wishes to comprehend the universe be equipped with the tools of thought, or else he will come off as poorly as he who should undertake to make a carved mahogany chair with no tools except his teeth and finger nails. What complicated machinery is required to transmute the rough ores into an American watch! And yet how common is the delusion that no elaboration of tools of thought is required to enable the commonest mind to manipulate the highest subjects of investigation. The alchemy that turned base metal into gold is only a symbol of that cunning alchemy of thought that by means of the philosopher's stone (scientific method) dissolves the base *facts* of experience into universal truths.

The uninitiated regards the philosophic treatment of a theme as difficult solely by reason of its technical terms. "If I only understood your use of words, I think I should find no difficulty in your thought." He supposes that under those bizarre terms there lurks only the meaning that he and

others put into ordinary phrases. He does not seem to think that the concepts likewise are new. It is just as though an Indian were to say to the carpenter, "I could make as good work as you, if I only had the secret of using my finger-nails and teeth as you do the plane and saw." Speculative philosophy—it cannot be too early inculcated—does not "conceal under cumbersome terminology views which men ordinarily hold." The ordinary reflection would say that Being is the ground of thought, while speculative philosophy would say that thought is the ground of Being; whether of other being, or of itself as being—for it is *causa sui*.

Let us now address ourselves to the task of elaborating our technique—the tools of thought—and see what new worlds become accessible through our mental telescopes and microscopes, our analytical scalpels and psychological plummets.

#### I.—A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI.

*A priori*, as applied to knowledge, signifies that which belongs to the nature of the mind itself. Knowledge which is before experience, or not dependent on it, is *a priori*.

*A posteriori* or *empirical* knowledge is derived from experience.

A criterion to be applied in order to test the application of these categories to any knowledge in question, is to be found in *universality* and *necessity*. If the truth expressed has universal and necessary validity it must be *a priori*; for it could not have been derived from experience. Of empirical knowledge we can only say: "It is true so far as experience has extended." Of *a priori* knowledge, on the contrary, we affirm: "It is universally and necessarily true and no experience of its opposite can possibly occur; from the very nature of things it must be so."

#### II.—ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL.

A judgment which, in the predicate, adds nothing new to the subject, is said to be *analytical*, as e. g. "Horse is an animal;"—the concept "animal" is already contained in that of "horse."

*Synthetical* judgments, on the contrary,

add in the predicate something new to the conception of the subject, as e. g. "This rose is red," or "The shortest distance between two points is a straight line;"—in the first judgment we have "red" added to the general concept "rose;" while in the second example we have *straightness*, which is quality, added to *shortest*, which is quantity.

### III.—APODEICTICAL.

Omitting the consideration of *a posteriori* knowledge for the present, let us investigate the *a priori* in order to learn something of the constitution of the intelligence which knows—always a proper subject for philosophy. Since, moreover, the *a priori analytical* ("A horse is an animal") adds nothing to our knowledge, we may confine ourselves, as Kant does, to *a priori synthetical* knowledge. The axioms of mathematics are of this character. They are universal and necessary in their application, and we know this without making a single practical experiment. "Only one straight line can be drawn between two points," or the proposition: "The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles,"—these are true in all possible experiences, and hence transcend any actual experience. Take any *a posteriori* judgment, e. g. "All bodies are heavy," and we see at once that it implies the restriction, "So far as we have experienced," or else is a mere analytical judgment. The *universal and necessary* is sometimes called the *apodeictical*. The conception of the *apodeictical* lies at the basis of all true philosophical thinking. He who does not distinguish between *apodeictic* and *contingent* judgments must pause here until he can do so.

### IV. SPACE AND TIME.

In order to give a more exhaustive application to our technique, let us seek the universal conditions of experience. The mathematical truths that we quoted relate to Space, and similar ones relate to Time. No experience would be possible without presupposing Time and Space as its logical condition. Indeed, we should never conceive our sensations to have an origin outside of ourselves and in distinct

objects, unless we had the conception of Space *a priori* by which to render it possible. Instead, therefore, of our being able to generalize particular experiences, and collect therefrom the idea of Space and Time in general, we must have added the idea of Space and Time to our sensation before it could possibly become an experience at all. This becomes more clear when we recur to the *apodeictic* nature of Space and Time. Time and Space are thought as *infinites*, i. e. they can only be limited by themselves, and hence are universally continuous. But no such conception as *infinite* can be derived analytically from an object of experience, for it does not contain it. All objects of experience must be *within* Time and Space, and not *vice versa*. All that is limited in extent and duration presupposes Time and Space as its logical condition, and this we know, not from the senses but from the constitution of Reason itself. "The third side of a triangle is less than the sum of the two other sides." This we never measured, and yet we are certain that we cannot be mistaken about it. It is so in all triangles, present, past, future, actual, or possible. If this was an inference *a posteriori*, we could only say: "It has been found to be so in all cases that have been measured and reported to us."

### V. MIND.

Mind has a certain *a priori* constitution; this is our inference. It must be so, or else we could never have any experience whatever. It is the only way in which the possibility of *apodeictic* knowledge can be accounted for. What I do not get from without I must get from within, if I have it at all. Mind, it would seem from this, cannot be, according to its nature, a finite affair—a thing with properties. Were it limited in Time or Space, it could never (without transcending itself) conceive Time and Space as universally continuous or infinite. Mind is not within Time and Space, it is as universal and necessary as the *apodeictic* judgments it forms, and hence it is the substantial essence of all that exists. Time and Space are the logical conditions of finite existences, and Mind is

the logical condition of Time and Space. Hence it is ridiculous to speak of *my* mind and *your* mind, for mind is rather the universal substrate of all individuality than owned by any particular individual.

These results are so startling to the one who first begins to think, that he is tempted to reject the whole. If he does not do this, but scrutinizes the whole fabric keenly, he will discover what he supposes to be fallacies. We cannot anticipate the answer to his objections here, for his objections arise from his inability to distinguish between his imagination and his thinking

and this must be treated of in the next chapter. Here, we can only interpose an earnest request to the reader to persevere and thoroughly refute the whole argument before he leaves it. But this is only one and the most elementary position from which the philosophic traveller sees the Eternal Verities. Every perfect analysis —no matter what the subject be—will bring us to the same result, though the degrees of concreteness will vary,—some leaving the solution in an abstract and vague form, —others again arriving at a complete and satisfactory view of the matter in detail.

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## S E E D L I F E .

BY E. V.

Ah! woe for the endless stirring,  
The hunger for air and light,  
The fire of the blazing noonday  
Wrapped round in a chilling night!

The muffled throb of an instinct  
That is kin to the mystic To Be;  
Strong muscles, cut with their fetters,  
As they writhe with claim to be free.

A voice that cries out in the silence,  
And is choked in a stifling air;  
Arms full of an endless reaching,  
While the "Nay" stands everywhere.

The burning of conscious selfhood,  
That fights with pitiless fate!  
God grant that deliverance stay not,  
Till it come at last too late;

Till the crushed out instinct waver,  
And fainter and fainter grow,  
And by suicide, through unusing,  
Seek freedom from its woe.

Oh! despair of constant losing  
The life that is clutched in vain!  
Is it death or a joyous growing  
That shall put an end to pain?